HR: 17:00h
AN: PA24A-05    [Abstracts]
TI: Global Partnership in Global Earth Observations
AU: * Smirnov, A
EM: smirnov@iiasa.ac.at
AF: International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis, Schlossplatz 1, Laxenburg, A-2361, Austria
AU: * Smirnov, A
EM: smirnov@iiasa.ac.at
AF: Moscow State University, Leninskie Gory, Moscow, 119991, Russian Federation
AU: Obersteiner, M
EM: oberstei@iiasa.ac.at
AF: International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis, Schlossplatz 1, Laxenburg, A-2361, Austria
AB: The emergence of a global partnership on earth observations will crucially drive the configuration of future observing systems and consequently shape how socio-economic benefits are generated. In this paper we take a game-theoretical approach to model cooperation on building global earth observation systems. We consider several societies whose economies are subject to shocks mimicking major natural disasters. Economies operate optimally and lead to the best possible expected value for the social welfares in the future. In order to increase its welfare even more society can make a decision to invest into a global alerting system which lowers the risk of disasters. We start our investigation from a single-society case and show conditions under which benefits of such investment can be reaped. The propensity to invest increases with economic affluence and degree of vulnerability to natural disasters. We find that for poor and/or less vulnerable countries it is better to forbear from investment. If to consider a situation of multiple societies a strategic gaming situation emerges motivated by the fact that every society will benefit from a global system regardless of whether they invested or not. Our analysis of possible equilibrium solutions shows that similar to the formation of trading blocks (e.g. EU, NAFTA) only in the case of similar societies we will observe cooperation behavior (when all invest) and otherwise we will observe free-riding. This insight, that we might face a prisoners dilemma problem in the formation of a GEOSS, has important implications for the GEO process.
DE: 6300 POLICY SCIENCES (7964)
DE: 6304 Benefit-cost analysis
SC: Public Affairs [PA]
MN: 2007 Fall Meeting